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amply provision for the surviving spouse and yet controls the ultimate
disposition of unconsumed property.
If the estate of the husband is large, and if the estate of the wife
is small, it is very desirable to qualify a devise or bequest for the
marital deduction. Giving the wife a life estate with a broad power
to consume will not qualify for the deduction, and the property will
be taxed for a second time in the estate of the wife if she has not con-
sumed the property at her death. Although the addition of the power
to make a gift of the property would seem to satisfy the requirements
of the Ellis case, the wife would still not have the power to appoint the
property to herself in such a way as to permit her to devise the property
by her will. While Section 2056(b)(5) of the 1954 Code does not
seem to require that the surviving spouse have the power to dispose
of the property by will, it would be unwise for the draftsman to ignore
the Pipe case. Consequently, if the marital deduction is deemed es-
sential, the devise or bequest should give the wife a life estate coupled
with a general intervivos power of appointment, with a remainder
over in default of appointment during her life.
On the other hand, if the wife has a sizeable estate of her own, it
would be unwise to take advantage of the marital deduction since the
estate tax upon the wife's death will be increased. In such a case,
ample provision may be made for the wife without increasing the
size of her estate for federal estate tax purposes. A devise or bequest
to the wife for life with the power to consume so much of the property
as is necessary for her support and maintenance, with remainder over
of whatever remains, will not cause the property to be taxed in the
wife's estate at her death. This type of devise or bequest may also
be desirable when the testator does not wish to give his wife such
extensive rights as accompany a general inter vivos power of appoint-
ment. To this somewhat limited degree, the power to consume may
still remain a useful estate planning device.
James Park, Jr.
NEWSPAPER CARRIER-SERVANT OR INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR?
Since the origin of the doctrine of vicarious liability over 200
years ago,' there have been many occasions for courts to consider
whether a particular employment relationship comes within that
I The first case which dealt with vicarious liability was Jones v. Hart, Holt
K.B. 642, 90 Eng. Rep. 1255 (1698), where C. J. Holt announced the principles
of vicarious liability.
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doctrine. It is the purpose of this note to discuss the business relation-
ship between the newspaper carrier2 and the publisher as a means of
determining whether the carrier should be treated as an employee for
whose wrongs the publisher is responsible under the doctrine of
vicarious liability, or whether he should be treated as an independent
contractor for whose wrongs the law generally does not make the
employer responsible.
The determination of whether the carrier is a servant or an inde-
pendent contractor becomes of importance in answering these two
legal questions: (1) Whether the publisher is liable when sued by a
third party for an injury negligently inflicted by the carrier while dis-
tributing the publisher's papers, and (2) Whether the carrier is in-
cluded as an "employee"3 within the meaning of that term as it is used
in modem social legislation, such as workman's compensation, social
security, unemployment insurance, labor relations acts and fair labor
standards acts.
It is arguable that the carrier should be considered as an employee
under our modem social legislation, for he is one of a group which
the legislation is ordinarily designed to protect. In National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Hearst Publications, Inc.,4 the Supreme Court of the
United States, adopting an "economic reality" test, held that newsboys
are "employees" within the meaning of that term as used in the
National Labor Relations Act. The Court there said:
Unless the common-law tests are to be imputed and made
exclusively controlling, without regard to the statutes purpose, it can-
not be irrelevant that the particular workers in these cases are subject
as a matter of economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed
to eradicate and that the remedies its affords are appropriate for
preventing them or curing their harmful effects in the special situa-
tion.5
Although the Supreme Court found that carriers are employees as
a matter of economic reality, this test has not been widely used in
cases arising under other branches of social legislation. The courts in
these cases, especially in the field of workman's compensation, seem
prone to use the common law distinction between a servant and an
independent contractor. Using this approach the carrier has been held
2 The term carrier is intended to connote a newspaper route carrier, or as he
is more commonly known, a "paperboy" or "newsboy."
3 The terms "servant' and employee" are used interchangeably by the courts
in many instances, but since the Restatement of Agency prefers to call them
"servants" this term will be used in this note.
4322 U.S. 111 (1944).
5 Id., at 127.
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to be an employee in some cases,6 while in other cases he has been
held to be an independent contractor.7 Likewise, although the carrier
has been expressly included within the benefits of the legislation in
some jurisdictions," he has been specifically excluded by other state
statutesY
In the absence, therefore, of a specific statutory provision on the
subject, the ensuing discussion as to whether the carrier is a servant
or an independent contractor will in most instances be equally ap-
plicable to situations where the status of the carrier needs to be
determined under modem social legislation, or where the carrier has
negligently injured a third person or his property. While the problem
under modem social legislation is not to be minimized, the situation
seems to be more serious when an innocent third person is harmed
by the carrier's negligence. If the injured party is not allowed to re-
cover from the publisher then he, in all probability, will be without
recourse, for the carrier seldom has any assets above a very limited
amount,10 and in many cases will not have liability insurance. At-
tention, therefore, will be focused on that aspect of the carrier's rela-
tionship with the publisher.
There are many definitions which attempt to differentiate between
a servant and an independent contractor.'1 However, because of the
many factors which enter into the decision as to which capacity one
may be acting within, none of these definitions are capable of stating
precisely a rule which can govern such decisions, but they can pro-
vide a guide for making these decisions. The Restatement of Agency
6California Employment Comn. v. Bates, 24 Cal. 2d 432, 150 P. 2d 192
(1944); Globe Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n., 208 Cal. 715, 284 Pac.
661 (1930); Press Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n., 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820
(1922); Call Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comn., 89 Cal. App. 194, 264 Pac. 800
Dist. Ct. App. 1928); Journal Pub. Co. v. State Unemployment Comp. Com'n.,
175 Or. 627, 155 P. 2d 570 (1945); Annot., 29 A.L.R. 2d 770 (1953).
7 State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Industrial Acc. Com'n., 216 Cal. 351, 14 P. 2d 306
(1932); New York Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n. 213 Cal. 43, 1 P. 2d 12
(1931); Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Greenlee, 150 Okla. 69, 300 Pac. 684 (1931);
Washington Recorder Pub. Co. v. Ernst, 199 Wash. 176, 91 P. 2d 718 (1939); 48
Am. Jur. 527 (1943).8 Wis. Stat. sec. 102.07 (1955). The benefits of this Workman's Compensa-
tion statute include, "Every person selling or distributing newspapers or magazines
on the street or from house to house."
9 Cal. Lab. Code Ann. sec. 3352 (1953). This Workman's Compensation
statute excludes, "Any person engaged in vending, selling, offering for sale, or
delivering directly to the public any newspaper, magazine, or periodical where
the title thereto has passed to the person so engaged."
10 In a recent check of the Lexington, Kentucky carriers who used cars, it
was found that the average age of these cars was approximately seven years with
an average value of $350.
11 Ballentine, Law Dictionary (1930); Bouvier, Law Dictionary (8th ed.
1915); 27 Am. Jur., Independent Contractors sec. 2 (1940).
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gives one of the best definitions of the distinction between a servant
and an independent contractor:
(1) A master is a principal who employs another to perform
service in his affairs and who controls or has the right to control the
physical conduct of the other in the performance of the service.
(2) A servant is a person employed by a master to perform
service in his affairs whose physical conduct in the performance of
the service is controlled or is subject to the right of control by the
master.
(3) An independent contractor is a person who contracts with
another to do something for him but who is not controlled by the
other nor subject to the other's right to control with respect to his
physical conduct in the performance of the undertaking.'12
This definition should be used in conjunction with Restatement
section 220 which lists several of the factors which have influenced the
courts in reaching a decision as to whether one in a given situation is
acting as a servant or an independent contractor. This section, which
is widely followed today, states:
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform service for an-
other in his affairs and who, with respect to his physical conduct in
the performance of the service is subject to the other's control or
right to control.
(2) In determining whether one acting for another is a servant
or an independent contractor, the following matters of fact, among
others, are considered:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master
may exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct
occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the
employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the in-
strumentalities, tools and the place of work for the person
doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business
of the employer; and
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the
relationship of master and servant.13
Each case involving the problem of whether one is acting as a
servant or an independent contractor must necessarily be decided on
its own facts. Since the courts have tended to use the factors stated
in section 220, it is felt that it would be helpful to analyze some of
these factors in terms of the carrier-publisher relationship.
12Restatement, Agency see. 2 (1933).
IM., sec. 220.
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It will be noted that the "control" test prescribed in paragraph (1)
of section 220 is stated as the governing criterion and that the factors
listed in paragraph (2) appear to serve merely as factual bases from
which inferences are to be drawn as to whether or not the control
test is satisfied. Some cases hold that the element of control standing
alone is insufficient to establish an employer-servant relationship, but
in any event it is indispensable to a finding of such relationship.
Whether it is the absolute governing criterion or not, control is deemed
the prime factor to be considered in determining whether the relation-
ship is one of employer-independent contractor or employer-servant.
Any case involving such a determination will certainly contain a dis-
cussion of the control factor.
In order for the employer's immunity from liability to exist, the
independent contractor must be free not only from the actual exercise
of control by the employer, but also from the right of the employer
to exercise control.14 Of course, as a practical matter some amount of
control is reserved to the employer in every employment situation,
but the determination as to whether one is acting as an employee or
independent contractor seems to be based on the kind of control
exercised or reserved. Naturally the employer expects one to produce
a desired result and has control of this aspect of the performance, but
this is not deemed sufficient to place liability on him if he does not
retain the right to control the means of attaining the result. In de-
termining when sufficient control is retained to classify one as a
servant, the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[T]he relation of master and servant exists whenever the employer
retains the right to direct the manner in which the business shall be
done, as well as the result to be accomplished, or, in other words,
'not only what shall be done, but how it shall be done.' 15
In Tyler v. MacFadden Newspapers Corp.,16 a case in which a
newspaper carrier was held to be an independent contractor, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court made the following statement as to when
one was an independent contractor even though the result of his
labor was controlled:
[Wihere one who contracts to perform a lawful service for another,
is independent of his employer in all that pertains to the execution
of the work, and is subordinate only in effecting a result in accordance
with the employer's design, he is an independent contractor. This is
14 Annot., 75 A.L.R. 725 (1931).
15 Singer Manufacturing Co. v. Raln, 132 U.S. 518, 523 (1889). The Com-
pany furnished a wagon to a canvasser who furnished a horse and harness and
worked on a commission basis. The canvasser was held to be a servant and the
Company liable to one negligently injured by the canvasser.
16 107 Pa. Super. 166, 163 At. 79 (1932).
[Vol. 6,
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so whenever one renders service in the course of an occupation,
representing the will of his employer only as to the result of his work
and not as to the means by which it is accomplished. 17
Does the newspaper publisher in the usual case retain sufficient
control over the carrier to justify holding him liable for the tortious
acts of the carrier? In attempting to answer this question some of the
various factors in paragraph (2) of section 220 will be discussed.
Independent calling or employment. It is believed that most people
consider a carrier as an employee and not as a person engaged in a
distinct business. If a paper is not delivered or the service is unsatis-
factory, the subscriber will call the paper and not the carrier. In fact,
most papers periodically state that if a paper is not delivered the news-
paper office should be called. The newspaper is also contacted when
a subscribed wishes to temporarily discontinue the delivery of the
paper, and in many instances the newspaper office is called when
starting or stopping a subscription. If the subscription is paid in ad-
vance, payment may be made directly to the newspaper.
Of course the physical delivery of a newspaper is entirely different
from the actual assimilation and writing of the news and the printing
of the paper. But the delivery of the paper is an essential element of
the newspaper's business, without which it could not exist. The carrier
is engaged to further the newspaper's business and not merely to
perform some particular function in which he is a specialist. It does
not seem that a carrier should be considered analogous to a person
engaged in an occupation which is considered independent in the
opinion of most people, such as a painter, a plumber, or a roofing
repairman.
Skill. The carrier is not hired because he possesses some special
skill which will enable him to perform a more creditable job. In fact,
the delivery of papers has always been thought of as an unskilled job
which is usually performed as part time work by teen-age boys.
Materials and equipment. The primary material or equipment
needed for a modem paper route is some satisfactory mode of trans-
portation. It has become progressively more customary for the carrier
to utilize some form of motorized transportation in the delivery of
his route.'8 In the majority of cases the carrier furnishes his own
17 Id., 163 Atl. at 81.
18 Although the automobile is responsible for the majority of injuries by or
to the carrier, there are several cases where the carrier was using a motorcycle,
and this practice is common today especially in the use of motorbikes and motor-
scooters. See Press Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n., 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac.
820 (1922); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1956);
Joslin v. Idaho Times Pub. Co., 56 Ida. 242, 53 P. 2d 323 (1935); Greening v.
Gazette Printing Co., 108 Mont. 158, 88 P. 2d 862 (1939).
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transportation, and it is the use of this transportation which usually
causes the injuries which are the bases of suits brought against the
publisher. The carrier in attempting to deliver his route as expediti-
ously as possible is often guilty of negligent or careless driving, such
as driving on the wrong side of the street and attempting to throw
papers to their destinations while driving with one hand. Of course,
if the publisher owned these vehicles it would be a much simpler
matter to hold him liable for the injuries negligently inflicted by the
carrier. 19 However, since the carrier is the owner of the vehicle, in
most cases it is difficult to show that the publisher retained control
over the manner of operation.
Length of time of employment. An independent contractor is often
employed for a specified length of time or by the job, while a servant's
employment is of a more indefinite duration. Closely connected with
this factor is the right to discharge. Some courts have felt that, if the
employer reserves the right to discharge, this is an important factor
in proving the requisite control necessary to establish the servant
relationship.20 However, this factor does not seem to have been of
great weight in publisher-carrier cases, for in almost all instances the
publisher reserves the right to discharge at will a carrier whom he
deems to be performing unsatisfactory work, yet the courts have
usually denied compensation to injured third parties.21
Compensation. Under the present plan followed by most news-
papers the carrier seems to be acting as an independent contractor in
respect to compensation, for he buys the papers from the publisher
and sells them for a profit. A typical arrangement is one in which the
carrier pays 3/ 4c per weekday paper and 11c per Sunday edition.
The carrier then sells the papers for 5c and 15c respectively, or delivers
both weekday and Sunday editions for $1.95 a month. This plan is
the prevailing situation except in cases of "motor routes," which are
routes that are so extended that they absolutely require the use of a
car or other motorized transportation. The carriers of these routes
are compensated by the publisher selling the papers at a reduced rate
to'the carrier, or giving him a mileage allowance, or giving him a flat
sum per week or month. When the motor route carrier has been com-
19 Ravare v. McCormick & Co., 166 So. 183 (La. App. 1936).20 Press Pub. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n., 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820 (1922);
Gallaher v. Ricketts, 187 So. 351 (La. App. 1939); Wilson v. Times Printing Co.,
158 Wash. 95, 290 Pac. 691 (1930).2 1 Batt v. San Diego Sun Pub. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 429, 69 P. 2d 216 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1937); Bohanon v. James McClatchy Pub. Co., 16 Cal. App. 188, 60 P.
2d 510 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So. 2d 276
(Fla. 1956).
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pensated by a flat sum some courts have held that he is a servant,22
while others have decided that this fact does not remove him from
the independent contractor category.23 The publisher has also been
held liable when he reimbursed a carrier for the expense incurred in
operating his automobile.24
Status the parties intended to create. This has been considered of
some weight in determining whether one is acting as a servant or
independent contractor.25 However, it is believed that this factor
should not be used in determining a carrier's status, since the carrier
in most instances is a minor who has little understanding of the legal
aspects of a contract and merely regards it as a form necessary to be
read or signed in order to secure the route.
20
A newspaper because of its inherently peculiar method of opera-
tion depends upon its circulation for its existence. Although only 15%
to 35% of a newspaper's income is derived from its circulation,2 7 the
circulation is of the utmost importance in securing advertising, which
accounts for the majority of a newspaper's revenue. There is a con-
tinuing struggle to increase a newspaper's circulation, for not only
does this aid in increasing the amount of advertising received, but
it also enables the paper to charge higher rates for its advertising
space.28 Thus it is seen that the newspaper has a very great interest
in insuring an adequate and satisfactory method of delivery. This is
especially true in our modem situation in which the competition for
subscribers is intense, and because of the greatly increased costs of
production this is often a life or death proposition.29
Since it is quite evident that the distribution of the newspaper is of
22 Robinson v. George, 16 Cal. 2d 238, 105 P. 2d 914 (1940); Press Pub. Co.
v. Industrial Ace. Com'n., 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820 (1922); Call Pub. Co. v.
Industrial Ace. Com'n., 89 Cal. App. 194, 264 Pac. 300 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928).
2 • v. Hirdes, 9 La. App. 688, 121 So. 775 (1929); Gall v. Detroit
Journal Co., 191 Mich. 405, 158 N.W. 36 (1916).
24 Gallaher v. Ricketts, 187 So. 351 (La. App. 1939); reversed on other
grounds in 191 So. 713 (La. App. 1939).
25 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1956); Oklahoma
Pub. Co. v. Greenlee, 150 Okla. 69, 300 Pac. 684 (1931).
20 Newspapers in most instances do not require the carrier to sign any form
of contract since most of the carriers are minors and the courts have unanimously
held that minor's contracts are either voidable or void.27 Pollard, Principles of Newspaper Management 39 (1937); Wolseley &
Campbell, Exploring Journalism 116 (2d ed. 1949).
.8 Thayer, Newspaper Business Management 190 (1954); Wolseley & Camp-
bell, Exploring Journalism 406 (2d ed. 1949); Pollard, Principles of Newspaper
Management 148 (1937). The advertising rate of a newspaper is based on its
rate per line multiplied by 1,000,000 and then divided by the newspaper's circula-
tion. This is called the milline rate.
29Villard, The Disappearing Daily 1 (1944). Increased costs of production




prime importance to the publisher, is it likely that he would relinquish
control over a function so important to the success of the paper?
Although this consideration, along with the status of the carrier under
the factors enumerated in the Restatement of Agency, would seem to
tend strongly in the direction of the carrier's being a servant, the
majority of cases which have considered the question have held that
the carrier is not subject to the control necessary to establish him as a
servant.
30
The courts in most instances have relied on the proposition that
the publisher does not control the manner of delivering the paper.3'
However, it is believed that in reality the publisher is exercising, or
has the right to exercise, sufficient control to enable the carrier to be
treated as a servant. In the typical case, the newspaper publisher re-
quires the carrier to complete the route by a stipulated time, charges
the carrier for each missed paper delivered by the publisher,32 instructs
the carrier to place the paper in a sheltered place in inclement
weather, limits his route to a definite area, and requires him to deliver
the paper to anyone on his route even though this may be very incon-
venient when the delivery point is isolated from the main route. The
publisher also usually reserves the right to discharge the carrier.33
Another reason sometimes given by the courts for holding the carrier
not to be a servant seems to be that he is acting as an independent
contractor by buying at wholesale and selling at retail.34 However,
the carrier still performs essentially the same functions and is subject
to the same control under this independent contractor plan as when
the practice was to pay the carrier a flat sum or to pay him for each
paper delivered.
Conclusion. It is believed that, in the carrier cases, a rigorous test
of actual control should yield to a more liberal doctrine based on the
general supervision over the details of performance which the typical
publisher assumes to possess as to a person whose economic station in
life is ordinarily thought of as a servant rather than an independent
30 See annot., 53 A.L.R. 2d 183 (1957).
31 Batt v. San Diego Sun Pub. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 429, 69 P. 2d 216 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1937); Bohanon v. James McClatchy Pub. Co., 16 Cal. App. 2d 188, 60
P. 2d 510 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Abate v. Hirdes, 9 La. App. 688, 121 So. 775
(1928); Gall v. Detroit Journal Co., 191 Mich. 405, 158 N.W. 36 (1916); Green-
ing v. Gazette Printing Co., 108 Mont. 158, 88 P. 2d 862 (1939); Oklahoma Pub.
Co. v. Greenlee, 150 Okia. 69, 300 Pac. 684 (1931).
32 This charge is usually from 15c to 25c per copy.
33In many cities the route is bought and sold by the carrier for a stipulated
sum per customer. This sum is usually between $1.00 and $5.00 per customer.
If the carrier refuses to sell his route when requested to do so by the newspaper,
the newspaper may sell the route and give the carrier the proceeds.
v. San Diego Sun Pub. Co., 21 Cal. App. 2d 429, 69 P. 2d 216 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1937).
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contractor. The relationship of the distribution of papers to the publi-
cation of the paper is so closely allied that any risk of injury by or to
the carrier should be placed on the publisher. Any economic loss to
the publisher occasioned by this policy can be distributed among the
readers in the form of a slightly higher subscription price or daily
rate. This would comport with one of the most widely recognized
justifications for vicarious liability, the distribution of risk theory,
which is based on the belief that it is better to spread inevitable losses
among a group than to let such losses fall on a few.35
Fred F. Bradley
REAL PROPERTY-PROMOTING THE MARKETABILITY OF
LAND TITLES
The absence of defects in the record chain of title, freedom from
incumbrances, and title in the vendor are the three factors upon which
the marketability of a land title is generally considered to depend.i
In order to determine whether these factors exist, the lawyer-con-
veyancer must examine the public record of countless transactions af-
fecting the particular land. He must, theoretically at least, verify
title back to the state or federal government. Since a lawyer will
seldom certify a title which is subject to conditions or restrictions or
which contains an apparently fatal record defect, such incumbrances
and defects remain a clog on the title and an impediment to its market-
ability. Such titles remain unmarketable so long as such incum-
brances and defects are valid of record, even though the person having
the right of enforcement may be totally ignorant of the existence of
such right.
In an effort to solve the problem of old title incumbrances and
defects, to establish a reasonable period for title search, and to give
the conveyancer some yardstick by which to appraise a title, the
legislatures of most of the states have, with varying degrees of success,
enacted four principal types of legislation: statutes of limitations,
curative acts, statutes limiting the duration of conditions and restric-
tions, and marketable title acts. In addition, several of the state bar
associations have adopted title standards. Each of the four types of
35 Smith, "Frolic and Detour," 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444 (1923); also see Baty,
Vicarious Liability 34 (1916) for a discussion of the theory that the employer is
liable because of his "deep pocket."; Harper, "The Basis of the Immunity of an
Employer of an Independent Contractor," 10 Ind. L. J. 494 (1935); Laski, "The
Basis of Vicarious Liability," 26 Yale L. J. 105 (1916); Morris, "The Torts of an
Independent Contractor," 29 II. L. Rev. 339 (1934).
13 American Law of Property 130 (Casner ed. 1952).
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